PAI: A lightweight mechanism for single-node memory recovery in DSM servers by Kim, Jangwoo et al.
Jangwoo Kim*       Jared C. Smolens*       Babak Falsafi*†       James C. Hoe*
*Computer Architecture Laboratory (CALCM), Carnegie Mellon University
†School of Computer and Communication Sciences, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne
http://www.ece.cmu.edu/~truss
PAI: A Lightweight Mechanism for Single-Node 
Memory Recovery in DSM Servers
Appears in the 13th IEEE Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (PRDC’07), 
December 2007, Melbourne AustrailiaAbstract
Several recent studies identify the memory system 
as the most frequent source of hardware failures in 
commercial servers. Techniques to protect the memory 
system from failures must continue to service memory 
requests, despite hardware failures. Furthermore, to 
support existing OS’s, the physical address space must 
be retained following reconfiguration. Existing 
techniques either suffer from a high performance 
overhead or require pervasive hardware changes to 
support transparent recovery.
In this paper, we propose Physical Address 
Indirection (PAI), a lightweight, hardware-based 
mechanism for memory system failure recovery. PAI 
provides a simple hardware mapping to transparently 
reconstruct affected data in alternate locations, while 
maintaining high performance and avoiding physical 
address changes. With full-system simulation of 
commercial and scientific workloads on a 16-node 
distributed shared memory server, we show that prior 
techniques have an average degraded mode 
performance loss of 14% and 51% for commercial and 
scientific workloads, respectively. Using PAI’s data-
swap reconstruction, the same workloads have 1% and 
32% average performance losses.
1.  Introduction
Commercial server systems based on distributed 
shared memory (DSM) architectures must provide reli-
able, high-performance operation, even in the face of 
hardware failures. Several recent studies identify the 
memory system as the most frequent source of failures 
in servers [12,16,19]. In a DSM, the memory address 
space spans all nodes; therefore the failure of any sin-
gle component—including DRAM chips, memory 
modules and memory controllers—or an entire mem-
ory node results in data loss that affects the entire sys-
tem. Downtime on critical server systems incurs 
significant financial costs [13]; therefore memory sys-
tem failure tolerance is a key design requirement.
Memory system protection in DSMs must achieve 
two system-level goals. First, to maintain reliability 
and availability, the system must continue running 
without data loss following component failure in a sin-
gle memory node. Furthermore, system must maintain 
performance while demapping and replacing the failed 
component. So long as availability and performance 
are maintained, data reconstruction can proceed gradu-
ally in the background before repair or 
replacement [1]. Second, operating systems (OS) nec-
essarily depend upon an immutable physical address 
space to hold critical data structures such as pinned, 
physically-addressed and “unrelocatable” pages  [19]. 
Therefore, even if underlying memory organization 
changes unexpectedly, existing OS’s require the physi-
cal address space to remain unchanged. 
Prior approaches either fail to meet these two 
requirements or require system-wide architectural 
changes to transparently tolerate changes in the physi-
cal memory organization. Distributed parity  [5,15] 
reconstructs the contents of failed memory components 
using mechanisms similar to the RAID-5 commonly 
used with disk arrays [14]. While it provides strong 
reconstruction properties, distributed parity incurs a 
significant performance penalty when operating in 
degraded mode where lost data is reconstructed on 
demand. “Memory page retirement” [19] leverages OS 
virtual memory support to unmap damaged physical 
pages, but cannot tolerate faults that affect unrelocat-
able pages [9,11]. Alternatively, the absolute location 
of physical addresses can be managed by a hypervisor, 
however this requires significant changes to the system 
architecture and hardware and firmware changes 
throughout the design to efficiently support the mem-
ory reorganization [1]. Furthermore, because single 
nodes can be repaired before additional failures 
occur [16], simple reconstruction mechanisms can pro-
vide the same reliability benefits as a heavyweight, but 
flexible hypervisor architecture.
In this paper, we present Physical Address Indirec-
tion (PAI), a lightweight hardware-based mechanism 
for transparent reconstruction of single-node memory 
failures in DSM servers. PAI transparently isolates the 
failed component from the rest of the system, recon-
structs lost values in other memory locations and 
reconfigures the memory system while avoiding 
changes to the physical address space. To preserve sys-
tem availability and minimize performance overheads, 
PAI reconstructs lost data off the critical path of mem-
ory requests using distributed parity. The hardware 
changes to implement PAI are constrained to the direc-
tory controller, avoiding invasive modifications to the 
complicated processor core and OS. 
We make the following contributions:
• Physical Address Indirection (PAI). We introduce 
the concept of PAI, a lightweight hardware-based 
mechanism for memory system reconstruction.
• Quantitative performance evaluation. We evalu-
ate PAI in using a full-system simulation of a 16-node 
DSM server with commercial database and web server 
workloads, as well as parallel scientific workloads, to 
show that:
1. Degraded mode causes a substantial perfor-
mance loss for all workloads.
2. Two reconstruction modes enabled by PAI that 
have negligible overheads for commercial (avg.< 2%) 
and moderate overheads for scientific workloads 
(avg.< 32%).
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, 
we provide a background discussion and reconstruc-
tion goals. Sections 3 and 4 describe the PAI mecha-
nism during error-free and reconstruction modes. 
Section 5 presents two reconstruction modes. We eval-
uate PAI in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
2.  Distributed parity protection 
This section discusses the vulnerabilities of the 
memory system to hardware faults and presents our 
fault model and reconstruction goals, describes a base-
line DSM server protected by distributed parity and 
summarizes conventional memory protection tech-
niques.
2.1.  Memory system vulnerability
Hard errors are permanent hardware component 
failures of a hardware device, ranging from individual 
transistors to entire DIMM packages, memory control-
lers and memory nodes. Unlike soft errors (e.g., radia-
tion-induced single-event upsets) which affect 
individual bits, hardware failures can cause small-scale 
multi-bit to large-scale gigabit data loss. These failures 
necessitate reconstruction mechanisms capable of 
rebuilding a large proportion of, or even all, the data 
stored on a memory node. 
As server workloads increase their memory 
requirements, the total system reliability increasingly 
depends upon the reliability of its memory system 
components. A recent study [16] shows that memory 
system faults comprise the single most common failure 
mode during a nine-year study of a large installation of 
high-performance servers. Field failure data collected 
by Microsoft and Sun also show that memory contrib-
utes most frequently to system downtime for hardware 
failures on Windows and Sun servers [12,19]. 
2.2.  Fault model
In this paper, we address reconstruction from hard 
failures originating in the memory controller and 
DRAM modules (shaded regions of Figure 1). We 
assume that memory includes SECDED ECC protec-
tion for soft error detection and correction and detec-
tion mechanisms can identify faults in the protected 
components (e.g., ECC detection on the memory 
arrays, self-checks and message time-outs), but that 
multi-bit errors are not recoverable with ECC protec-
tion alone. We assume that the remaining components 
in the system, including processors, caches, directory 
controller and NIC are protected by other, complemen-
tary mechanisms. For example, previously proposed 
processor redundancy [5] or checkpoint-based protec-
tion techniques [15,18] can be applied for non-memory 
component failures. 
2.3.  Distributed parity protection
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FIGURE 1. DSM server’s memory system (shaded 
area) protected by (7:1) distributed parity.
The baseline system in this paper is the distributed 
shared memory (DSM) machine shown in Figure 1. 
Each node contains a processor with caches, a direc-
tory-based cache coherence controller, memory con-
troller and associated DRAM channels, and a network 
interface to communicate with other nodes. Each mem-
ory node, consisting of the shaded memory controller, 
memory channels and DIMM modules, contributes to 
the system’s large, single physical address (PA) space. 
To support node-level reconstruction in DSM 
servers, recent studies propose distributing parity 
across nodes [5,15], as shown in Figure 1. These pro-
posals arrange parity groups in a RAID level-5-like 
fashion [14], allowing parity group sizes that scale with 
the system size. Distributed parity has a scalable stor-
age overhead which is amortized by distributing the 
parity group over multiple nodes. Distributed parity 
survives a single memory node failure per parity group 
by reconstructing the lost information in “degraded 
mode” with the bitwise XOR of the remaining data val-
ues and the parity value. 
The system uses a distributed parity configuration 
as described by Prvulovic et al. in ReVive [15]. Parity 
is the bitwise XOR of all data stored in its parity group. 
Every data write updates the parity, on a remote node, 
with a new parity value obtained by bitwise-XOR of 
the old data, new data and old parity. Parity manage-
ment is implemented by modifying the existing cache-
coherence protocol and per-node directory controllers. 
In this paper, we assume parity is updated on a cache 
block granularity [5].
2.4.  Recovery challenges with hardware faults 
In degraded mode, distributed parity protection 
reconstructs data on each memory request. However, 
reconstruction compounds the memory latency prob-
lem for every value stored in the failed node. Each 
memory request incurs multiple additional requests to 
remote nodes to reconstruct the block, significantly 
reducing overall performance [5,15].
An ideal reconstruction mechanism instead 
rebuilds the lost data just once in an alternate location 
and redirects subsequent memory requests to the new 
location. However, relocation and message redirection 
based on changing the physical address is impossible 
when a failed component contains pinned pages—an 
unavoidable situation in large-scale failures. Although 
pinned pages consume a small fraction of the total PA 
space, field data collected from Sun servers using 
Solaris’s memory page retirement (MPR) show that in 
approximately 50% of failures, page retirement cannot 
be completed due to pinned pages in the damaged 
address range, leading to a system crash or data 
corruption [19]. Sun’s experience motivates a real need 
for memory systems that transparently relocate pinned 
pages. Alternatively, significant OS changes would be 
required to eliminate pinned pages [9,19]. 
2.5.  Conventional memory protection
Hardware-based memory protection uses informa-
tion redundancy to protect against failures. These 
mechanisms include ECC [17] and Chipkill [4], which 
protect against small numbers of failures in bits and 
single chips, respectively. However, these techniques 
neither protect against larger-scale component failure 
nor permit memory replacement without data loss. 
Board-level techniques such as memory mirroring, par-
ity-based RAID and DIMM sparing  [2,8] provide pro-
tection across DIMM modules on a single memory 
node. However, they have a fixed cost overhead, rang-
ing from 33% for 3:1 RAID to 100% for memory mir-
roring, which cannot be amortized over the size of the 
system. Distributed parity [5,15] provides scalable pro-
tection, including reconstruction of data following the 
failure of an entire memory node, by spreading parity 
across nodes in the system and can amortize the cost 
over several nodes. However, degraded mode opera-
tion with distributed parity incurs a significant perfor-
mance loss.
Other approaches include Solaris’s MPR [19], 
which demaps virtual pages that have been affected by 
a failure. This technique cannot restore lost data and 
cannot recover from failures that affect unrelocatable 
pages. In contrast, hardware hypervisor-based systems 
can perform flexible remapping and migration of OS-
visible physical addresses memory pages to new abso-
lute memory locations at runtime [1]. However, this 
approach requires architectural changes in all levels of 
the memory system to support page migration and ded-
icated hardware and firmware to map and manage the 
memory locations. Furthermore, while the hypervisor 
can move memory pages arbitrarily, this flexibility 
exceeds what is needed to survive a single failure in the 
memory system.
3.  Physical Address Indirection
In this section, we introduce Physical Address 
Indirection (PAI), a lightweight mechanism that 
enables high-performance, transparent memory recon-
struction, using distributed parity, following memory 
failures. Figure 2 shows a DSM system of 2N nodes 
protected by N:1 distributed parity. Memory from N+1 
nodes forms a parity group where N nodes store data 
information and the remaining node stores parity (as in 
RAID-5 [14], parity is the bitwise XOR of all data val-
ues). 
PAI provides a mapping between a physical 
address and its actual location (e.g., which memory 
node and parity group holds the data). PAI adds an 
additional level of address indirection for pages in 
memory, below that of the physical addresses seen by 
the OS. PAI comprises several control registers (PAI 
registers) with a simple, fast address translation logic 
between processor’s directory controller, memory con-
troller and network interface. 
Parity is arranged into parity groups where nodes 
are divided into two sets of N nodes apiece and are 
numbered in order of increasing PA. Each node is fur-
ther divided into N+1 vertical equally-sized sub-groups
where N hold data and one holds parity. The parity for 
each group resides in a different set from the data. To 
locate a group’s parity, a cross-set register (X-Set) 
FIGURE 2. Distributed parity protection using PAI 
translations during error-free operation.
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holds the number of the first node in the opposing set 
(e.g., in Figure 2, in Nodes 0 to N-1, X-set is N, while 
in nodes N to 2N-1, X-set is 0). This ensures that data 
and its parity never occupy the same node, and there-
fore, enough information always remains to reconstruct 
lost data or parity values after a single failure. 
Figure 2 also shows the mapping from a cache 
block’s PA to its corresponding parity. Each PA is 
divided into several logical fields that define the initial 
location of the cache block:
• Node ID 
• Parity group number of the address (GN)
• Data address offset within the group (GO)
For each group, the parity node ID is calculated by 
summing the group number and the X-set register for 
that node. The parity sub-group is statically assigned to 
a sub-group on the node. To simplify presentation and 
without loss of generality, we choose the highest sub-
group on each node to hold parity. 
The parity sub-groups in PAI are arranged in a 
“horizontal” fashion across the set. In this arrange-
ment, each sub-group occupies the same physical 
address offsets in each node. This contrasts with “diag-
onal” arrangements, such as Intel E8500 [8]. While 
diagonal parity offers better load balancing, it also 
makes recovery difficult with unrelocatable pages. In 
horizontal parity, each parity group is less likely to 
contain unrelocatable pages because these pages are 
typically located in a small range of fixed physical off-
sets in each node. By contrast, each diagonal parity 
group is likely to contain at least one unrelocatable 
page. Parity group arrangements that avoid unrelocat-
able pages are desirable for the data swap mode recon-
struction presented in Section 5.
4.  Reconstruction
This section describes PAI’s reconstruction mech-
anism for surviving memory component failures. 
4.1.  Degraded mode reconstruction
When a memory component fails, the system 
enters degraded mode. In degraded mode, the distrib-
uted parity can reconstruct lost data from the remaining 
data and parity values. However, reconstruction 
imposes a significant performance overhead because 
every memory request on the failed node incurs multi-
ple reconstruction requests. This situation persists until 
repair of the failed node. PAI also uses degraded mode 
reconstruction to restore lost data to alternate locations 
with a single mechanism. We explain how to locate 
reconstructed data in Section 5.
4.2.  Memory system reconstruction
Following a memory component failure, a portion 
of the global physical address space disappears from 
the system. To recover to a high-performance state and 
restore parity protection, the faulty memory compo-
nents must be mapped out and the affected pages must 
be moved to a fault-free memory node. 
To reconstruct a failed node, PAI performs the 
operations shown in Figure 3. First, PAI coordinates 
on-line reconstruction of the lost data in alternate loca-
tions. While the reconstruction is performed in the 
background, PAI serves memory requests through 
degraded mode reconstruction or from new locations, 
depending on the reconstruction progress. Finally, 
when the reconstruction process completes, PAI 
resumes high-performance operation mode by redirect-
ing subsequent requests to the reconstructed data. The 
failed memory is isolated from the rest of system.
Containment and reconstruction. PAI initiates 
on-line reconstruction of lost data according to the sys-
tem reconstruction policy. PAI distinguishes already 
reconstructed regions from those pending reconstruc-
tion by maintaining a Reconstruction Register that con-
tains the current reconstruction physical address in the 
directory controller of the failed memory node. Recon-
struction is performed in the background, starting from 
the lowest physical address on the failed node and con-
FIGURE 3. Steps in reconstruction and recovery of 
data from a failed memory node.
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taining to the highest affected address. Following 
reconstruction, the failed component can be repaired.
Servicing requests during reconstruction. While 
reconstruction is performed in the background, PAI 
continues servicing memory requests. Requests are 
first sent to the respective home directory controller. 
PAI compares the requested address with the contents 
of the Reconstruction Register to determine the proper 
method for accessing the data. If the address is already 
reconstructed, the directory controller forwards the 
address to the PAI translation and completes the mem-
ory request, otherwise the directory controller issues a 
degraded mode request. 
Leaving reconstruction mode. Once the recon-
struction process has rebuilt all affected data for the 
failed node, the system enters recovery mode. In this 
mode, mode-specific PAI registers are updated with the 
failed node ID and recovery policy. Unlike reconstruc-
tion, where all memory requests are first sent to the 
failed home node, PAI minimizes the memory request 
latency by immediately translating the PAI address. 
Thus, memory requests go directly to the reconstructed 
node and the effective memory latency is the same as 
other remote requests.
5.  Memory Recovery Modes
In this section, we present two recovery modes 
enabled by PAI: spare memory and data swap modes.
5.1.  Spare Memory Mode
Spare memory mode utilizes a spare node with 
equal memory as the other nodes. This mode restores 
all data using parity reconstruction from the failed 
memory node onto the spare [17]. Using PAI, the sys-
tem sends subsequent memory requests to the spare. 
During error-free operation, PAs do not resolve to 
the spare memory node’s ID. Upon entry into recon-
struction, the data and parity values are reconstructed 
on the spare node by changing PAI’s translation. PAI 
replaces the node ID of the failed node (Fail ID regis-
ter) in the original PA with the spare memory node’s 
ID. This remaps all PAs from the failed node without 
involving the OS and user programs or changing the 
amount of addressable memory in the system.
Spare memory nodes increase the cost of the sys-
tem, however the overhead can be amortized over the 
size of the system. For typical DSM machines with 
four to sixteen memory nodes [3,10], the spare mem-
ory node overhead is lower than existing on-board 
redundancy mechanisms such as memory mirroring, 
RAID and DIMM sparing [2,8].
5.2.  Data Swap Mode
FIGURE 4. Data swap mode recovery rebuilds 
failed node i’s data in an evicted group. The 
reconstruction process and updated PAI 
mappings are shown.
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Data swap mode maintains both redundancy and 
performance by reducing the available system memory, 
while incurring no additional hardware costs. Data 
swap mode leverages the OS’s virtual memory support 
to free one parity group by swapping pages to disk or 
migrating the data to other free pages. Data swap mode 
reconstructs data from the failed node into the freed 
group, as shown in Figure 4. 
Data swap mode must free an entire parity group. 
An ideal choice is to evict the parity group that lost its 
parity—the parity stored on the failed node—because 
this group is otherwise without protection. However, 
the OS may not evict this parity group if it contains 
pinned pages. The OS can instead choose another par-
ity group with no pinned pages. The OS can find a free 
parity group easily because the memory uses horizon-
tal parity groups. 
Once the selected parity group is freed, data swap 
mode reconstructs data to the freed parity group. PAI 
then maps transparently requests for the failed node to 
the replacement parity group. By maintaining the origi-
nal parity sub-groups, PAI preserves parity protection 
for the reconstructed data. Figure 4 summarizes the 
mappings for message redirection and parity address 
construction of remapped address. 
Data swap mode exposes a subtle addressing 
restriction during recovery: data sub-groups cannot 
reside on the same node as their parity. Data swap 
mode avoids this problem by horizontally shifting the 
location of relocated data by one node, ensuring that 
data and parity are always separated.
Data swap mode retains the error correction capa-
bilities of the baseline system, but reduces the available 
memory by one parity group. Data swap mode can also 
protect multiple node failures in one set with multiple 
PAI registers and further reducing memory. This is 
equivalent to the protection afforded by multiple spare 
memory nodes, without added hardware. 
6.  Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of 
PAI recovery modes. 
6.1.  Methodology
We evaluate the performance of PAI in FLEXUS, a 
full-system timing simulator [7]. We simulate a 16-
node DSM running Solaris 8. Each node contains 
detailed processor core, microcoded directory control-
ler, memory controller, and DRAM models. Nodes 
communicate using a directory-based NACK-free, 3-
hop cache-coherence protocol over an interconnect 
based on the HP GS1280 [3]. We list the relevant 
parameters in Table 1. 
TABLE 1. DSM server and workload configuration.
Processing 
Nodes
UltraSPARC III ISA, TSO consistency
4 GHz, 8-wide, 8-stage; out-of-order 
256-entry ROB, LSQ and store buffer
L1 Caches Split I/D, 64KB 2-way, 2-cycle latency
4 ports, 32 MSHRs
L2 Cache Unified, 8MB 8-way, 25-cycle latency
1 port, 32 MSHRs
Main Memory 60 ns latency, 2 channels, 32 banks
16 entry read/write queues per channel
Parity Protection Two 8:1 parity groups for 16 nodes
Protocol Engine 1 GHz controller, 64 contexts
Interconnect 4x4 2D torus, 25 ns latency per hop
128 GB/s peak bisection bandwidth
Commercial Workloads
DSS-DB2 10GB data, 3GB buffer pool
OLTP-DB2 10GB data, 64 clients, 450 MB buffer pool
OLTP-Oracle 10GB data, 16 clients, 1.4 GB buffer pool
Web 16K connections, fastCGI
Scientific Workloads
Em3d 3M nodes, degree 2, span 5, 15% remote
Ocean 1026^2 grid, 9600s rlx, 20K res., err.tol.1e-7
We evaluate six commercial and two scientific 
workloads. We run both IBM DB2 v8 ESE and Oracle 
10g Enterprise Database Server with an on-line trans-
action processing (OLTP) workload modeled after 
TPC-C. We evaluate a decision support system (DSS) 
workload modeled after TPC-H on DB2, using two 
representative queries: scan-bound query 1 and join-
bound query 2. We evaluate web server performance 
using SpecWeb99 running on both Apache HTTP 
Server v2.0 and Zeus Web Server v4.3. We also evalu-
ate two scientific workloads: em3d exhibits producer-
consumer sharing between pairs of processors and 
ocean exhibits bursts of memory transactions. Our 
workloads are carefully tuned to produce representa-
tive memory system behavior. 
We allocate pages to reduce remote misses and 
balance load: round-robin and first-touch for commer-
cial and scientific workloads, respectively.
We use a systematic paired-measurement sam-
pling approach derived from SMARTS [20]. We collect 
a sample size targeting 5% confidence intervals with 
measurements of 50,000 cycles, using warmed 
microarchitectural structures. For commercial work-
loads, we measure user-mode instructions committed, 
which is proportional to overall system throughput [6]. 
In scientific workloads, we measure the user-mode 
instructions committed by the slowest node over time, 
which reflects the overall execution time for the work-
load. In data swap mode, we assume the OS locates 
enough free virtual pages to absorb the decreased 
memory space, thus swapping to disk is unnecessary.
6.2.  Recovery mode performance
In this section, we evaluate the performance of 
PAI’s recovery modes after a hard failure in a single 
memory node. For data swap and spare memory 
modes, all data reconstruction and page migrations 
have taken place and the system is now operating in 
steady-state execution with one memory node inactive. 
Execution during the reconstruction process is similar 
to degraded mode, however the situation only lasts 
until reconstruction has completed. 
Figure 5 shows the performance of degraded, data 
swap, and spare memory modes, normalized to error-
free execution. 
Degraded mode. Degraded mode suffers from a 
significant performance loss—averaging 14% for com-
mercial workloads and 51% for scientific workloads. 
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FIGURE 5. Recovery mode performance.
Every memory request to the failed node requires 
reconstruction of lost data and directory values. The 
failed node’s performance is impacted because local 
memory must be reconstructed. The other nodes are 
degraded due to the increased remote latency of blocks 
owned by the failed node. Therefore, even though only 
a fraction of the address space is degraded, all nodes 
have a longer memory latency.
We now discuss this effect quantitatively. Table 2
TABLE 2. Workload memory characteristics per 1K 
cycles from baseline execution.
L2 
Misses
Write-
backs
Dirty 
Misses
Parity 
Updates
DSS-Scan-DB2 0.78 0.01 0.28 0.29
DSS-Join-DB2 2.48 0.22 0.58 0.80
OLTP-DB2 3.95 0.30 0.54 0.84
OLTP-Oracle 5.18 0.57 0.44 1.01
Web-Apache 2.96 0.53 0.41 0.94
Web-Zeus 3.09 0.24 0.45 0.69
Em3d 7.94 1.85 0.02 1.87
Ocean 6.21 4.15 0.22 4.37
summarizes the average frequency of L2 misses, write-
backs, dirty misses (remote misses to modified data) 
and parity updates during error-free mode. Parity 
updates are divided into those from writebacks and 
dirty misses. The commercial workloads show a clear 
bias towards dirty sharing, while the scientific work-
loads exhibit frequent writeback requests. Therefore, 
during degraded mode the performance of commercial 
workloads will decrease because of remote memory 
accesses, while scientific workloads will be slow due 
to a high L2 miss rate.
FIGURE 6. Execution time breakdown for (A) fault-
free, (B) degraded, (C) data swap, and (D) sparing 2-
hop modes, normalized to fault-free execution.
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This expectation is reflected in the execution time 
breakdown result during error-free and the recovery 
modes, in Figure 6. The execution time is divided into 
on-chip execution, time spent in spin-locks, stores, 
reads for private data and remote data. Compared to 
error-free mode, commercial workloads spend addi-
tional time in off-chip remote read and write requests 
during the degraded mode. This reflects the increased 
latency for reconstructing shared data. Em3d spends 
additional time on local reads, due to the increased 
local memory read latency, while ocean spends addi-
tional time on stores, due to the increased local write-
back latency.
Spare memory mode. 
FIGURE 7. Performance sensitivity of spare node as
average distance from the failed node changes.
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We now study performance 
after reconstruction in spare memory mode. Figure 7
shows the performance when varying the distance 
between the failed and spare nodes. We vary from one 
network hop to eight hops to study effects beyond the 
maximum four hop distance in our interconnect. 
The average performance impact at two hops is 
2% for commercial workloads and 26% for scientific 
workloads. The primary overhead is increased memory 
access latency from the failed node’s once-local data 
that is now on the spare. Other nodes do not experience 
significant performance loss because both directory 
and memory requests are already remote. Commercial 
workloads show little sensitivity because only a small 
fraction of the remote accesses are affected. However, 
performance for scientific workloads is severely 
degraded as the distance increases due to redirecting 
once-local memory requests to the remote spare. 
Data swap mode. In data swap mode, PAI sends 
memory requests for the failed node directly to the 
reconstructed data locations. As with spare memory 
mode, only the local accesses to the lost memory 
observe increased latency from redirection.
The average distance between a failed node and 
the reclaimed space in other nodes is about 2.5 hops. 
Therefore, the performance of data swap mode is com-
parable to the performance of spare memory mode at 
2.5 hops. The average performance impact is 1% and 
32% for commercial and scientific workloads, respec-
tively. Increased local memory access latency is the 
primary performance factor during degraded mode, 
therefore the performance of spare node at two hops 
and data swap mode are similar (as shown in Figure 6). 
For scientific workloads, data swap outperforms the 
spare memory mode at four hops and performs worse 
than spare memory mode at two hops. The slowdown 
comes from contention in nodes accepting additional 
memory requests, due to PAI redirection. By contrast, 
spare memory mode does not increase contention. 
7.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose Physical Address Indi-
rection (PAI), a lightweight, hardware-based mecha-
nism for memory system failure recovery. PAI provides 
a simple hardware mapping to transparently recon-
struct affected data in alternate locations, while main-
taining high performance and avoiding physical 
address changes. With full-system, timing simulation 
of commercial and scientific workloads on a DSM 
server, we show that prior techniques have a substantial 
performance loss following hardware failure, while 
commercial workloads using PAI have a negligible 
performance loss.
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